Research

Working Papers

Politics Without a Price: External service provision and democratic accountability

Shows how external service provision can weaken democratic accountability: experimental evidence from the Philippines links a community-driven development program to reduced public service spending and procurement directed toward political supporters, with effects concentrated where electoral competition is weak.

Abstract

Democratic accountability assumes that voters reward or punish politicians for observed welfare, but public services are often delivered by non-state actors. When citizens can see benefits but not who provided them, politicians might be able to redirect state resources with little electoral cost. I argue that external provision can weaken democratic accountability by relaxing the electoral constraint that disciplines the use of public resources. I provide experimental evidence from the Philippines showing that a community-driven development program led politicians to reduce public service spending and direct procurement to political supporters. These effects are concentrated in municipalities with low political competition, where incumbents face weaker electoral pressure. I offer suggestive evidence that these political consequences attenuated the program’s welfare gains. These results identify a limitation of democratic accountability: sharing service delivery between state and non-state actors can weaken constraints on both the level and distribution of public resources.

Suggested citation

Finstein, Blaine. Politics Without a Price: External service provision and democratic accountability. Working paper.

Working paper and appendix

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Current Projects

Reciprocal Rent-seeking

Examines how local politicians’ dependence on national political resources can turn reelection incentives into a motive for rent extraction.

Agricultural Production and Elite Network Structure

Coauthors: José Gloria (UCLA)

Examines how historical sugar production shaped local elite networks in the Philippines and whether these networks influence elite capture and the allocation of public resources today.

Abstract

This paper examines how the historical organization of agricultural production shapes the formation of local elite networks. We study the Philippine sugar industry, where fixed processing mills created economic chokepoints that limited producers’ outside options and concentrated dependence on local landed elites. We argue that these conditions affected not only the distribution of economic power, but also the formation of relationships among elite families. Combining historical data on sugar mills with electoral data on political families, we construct local family networks and study how exposure to historical production chokepoints shaped both family-to-family tie formation and the resulting structure of elite networks. We then examine whether these historically formed network structures shape modern elite capture and the allocation of public resources. The paper shows how historical production technologies can leave lasting political legacies by shaping the networks through which elite power is organized.

Selected Other Publications

A Comment on “Extraction, Assimilation, and Accommodation: The Historical Foundations of Indigenous-State Relations in Latin America”

Coauthors: Konstantin Ash (University of Central Florida) and Daniel Carnahan (UCLA)

Replicates Carter (2024) as part of the Institute for Replication discussion paper series and meta study.

Abstract

Carter (2024) examines the historical conditions that shape protection versus assimilation for indigenous communities, arguing that state-led conscription programs are one such factor. In a natural experiment leveraging conscription for a 1920s Peruvian highway designed to replicate a pre-colonial road system (Qhapaq Ñan), Carter finds through a geographic regression discontinuity design that eligibility for state conscription increased the likelihood of a municipality having an indigenous movement by about 30 percentage points (approximately .75 standard deviations) and scores on an omnibus accommodation measure by about .3 items (approximately .4 standard deviations). The omnibus measure includes the number of institutions that an indigenous community reports preserving (increased by .3 items on a 7 point scale, or .25 standard deviations), likelihood of having a communal land title (increased by 12 percentage points, or .3 standard deviations), and likelihood of registration with the government (increased by 9 percentage points, or .3 standard deviations). All point estimates are significant at the .1% level.

We successfully computationally reproduce all main claims of the paper but find inconsistencies between the map of the road presented by Carter and that used by Franco et al. (2021) that affect its passage through a small number of municipalities. In order to investigate whether these municipalities drive the main findings without the ability to identify municipalities in the data, we drop municipalities iteratively and re-run the analysis, finding only minor changes in coefficient estimates across subsets. In addition, we explore a number of sensitivity analyses for the regression discontinuity design that vary the functional form, vary the bandwidth window, and use the Rosenbaum method for window selection. While the results remain consistent under all analyses, we recommend for further research to recode treated municipalities on the basis of the alternative road map and explore the as-if random assumption in light of evidence linking proximity to the precolonial road to various economic and political outcomes.

Suggested citation

Finstein, Blaine; Ash, Konstantin; Carnahan, Daniel (2024) : A Comment on “Extraction, Assimilation, and Accommodation: The Historical Foundations of Indigenous-State Relations in Latin America”, I4R Discussion Paper Series, No. 176, Institute for Replication (I4R), s.l.

Paper

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